Psychological assistance to the wives of servicemen. The specifics of the social problems of military personnel. Social security of a soldier and his family

Participation in foreign policy measures of 1848-1849, aimed at suppressing revolutionary uprisings in Europe, strengthened Russia's international reputation 1 . At the same time, our country's adversaries did not want to allow its position in the East to strengthen and sought to deprive Russia of its "voice" in the struggle between the opposing interests of the European powers 2 .

Therefore, in the dispute that arose between Russia and Turkey about the Holy places in Palestine, which was a pretext for unleashing a military conflict, England and France took the side of the Turkish Sultan.

In the autumn of 1853, the long and bloody Crimean War began, ending in 1856 with the defeat of Russia. The outcome of the Eastern War changed the balance of power in Europe. Russia's influence in the Balkans and the Middle East has diminished, and the "Vienna system" has finally ceased to exist. The anti-Russian "Crimean system" 4 has come to replace it.

In Russian society, an opinion was more and more openly formed about the need for reforms in all spheres of public administration. So, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia K.V. Nesselrode pointed out the need to "concentrate efforts on defending one's own Russian interests" 5 , the first of which was the development of "moral and material forces" 6 .

The completed Crimean War showed not only the political, economic and military weakness of tsarist Russia, but also the impossibility of preserving the old feudal-serf system, exposed all the flaws of the military system that had developed in the country.

The most important shortcomings in the management of the military ground forces at the end of the 50s of the XIX century were:

1. Inconsistency of the recruiting system with the tasks of creating a well-trained mass army.

2. Imperfection of the organizational structure of the armed forces.

3. Outdated weapons and the backwardness of official views on the training of troops.

4. Low professional training of a significant part of the officers.

After its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia actually found itself in international isolation. In parallel, new military coalitions began to form in Europe, which led to an increase in the threat of a new war, for which Russia was completely unprepared. Under these conditions, the preservation of the existing system of military command became impossible and, moreover, dangerous.

The seriousness of the international threat forced the tsarist government to carry out a profound reform of military administration, which was called "Milyutinskaya" after the name of its author and creator.

The military transformations of the second half of the 19th century, carried out by the Minister of War, Field Marshal Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin, are recognized as the most successful in the history of Russia. They were timely, complete and affected all branches of military affairs. Carrying out military reforms, Milyutin relied on the experience of the Russian army and its commanders, and also took into account the best Western European experience.

A highly educated general, a liberal in his convictions, an active supporter of army reform, D. A. Milyutin made an invaluable contribution to strengthening the armed forces and combat power of the Russian state. The career of this most famous minister of war in Russia began in 1833, when he was only 17 years old. Already at an early age, he gained combat experience in skirmishes with mountaineers while serving in the Caucasus, established himself as an excellent general staff officer, and for his work in the field of military history was elected a corresponding member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and a doctor of Russian history.

In 1860, D. A. Milyutin became a comrade (deputy) of the Minister of War, and on November 9 (21) of the following year he was appointed Minister of War of the Russian Empire.

Milyutin began his activities as Minister of War by drawing up a general program of work for the department, which faced the huge and extremely difficult task of reorganizing the entire system of military command and increasing the combat capability of the army while reducing the cost of maintaining it.

Well-known specialists and scientists were involved in the development of the plan for the planned transformations. The closest assistants to the Minister of War were the actual State Councilor F.G. Ustryalov, who had extensive experience in military legislation, professors of the Nikolaev Military Academy, Colonel V.M. Anichkov and N.N. Obruchev; duty general of the General Staff Count F.L. Heiden; Director of the Office of the War Ministry, General K.P. Kaufman and other prominent specialists.

For a detailed development of reforms in the ministry, a Special Conference was formed, chaired by the Minister of War, which met almost daily. And to discuss individual, most important issues, as necessary, separate commissions were created, which included specialists in all branches of military affairs.

After two months, the program of transformations in the army, which became the result of a lot of hard work, was presented to Alexander II on January 15 (27), 1862 by D.A. Milyutin pointed out in his report to the emperor that the reform was designed for a long time and would require accuracy and caution, so necessary in the matter of administrative changes.

The main idea of ​​the program drawn up, as the Minister of War wrote, was "to bring the whole building (i.e., the military command and control system - ed.) into a harmonious appearance and to simplify its entire complex mechanism, and for this it was recognized as useful to merge together parts that are homogeneous in terms of a circle of actions, and to destroy superfluous growths, which over time were formed more or less accidentally, without any plan.

The most important task of the military reforms of the 60s-70s of the 19th century was the creation of a modern mass army capable of providing a high defense capability of the country. The preparation of well-trained reserves, the skillful organization of supplies and the compactness of command and control made it possible to maintain a small active army in peacetime, which would be ready for rapid deployment in wartime.

The reforms affected all areas of military affairs - central and local administration, organization and staffing of the army, weapons, training of officers, training and education of troops, judicial office work and medical service.

Reorganization of military administration
One of Milyutin's first reforms was the reorganization of the central military administration system and the creation of territorial bodies in the form of district headquarters (the creation of a military district system).

Military judicial reform
In the 60s of the nineteenth century, a military-judicial reform was also carried out in the army, the essence of which was to change views on soldier service, improve the morale of the army, and form a sense of duty and honor among military personnel.

Reforms of military educational institutions
Transformations in the governing bodies, improvement of technology, changes in the combat training of troops demanded from the officer not only knowledge of military service, but also general and special education, mental development and high moral qualities.

Rearmament of the army
In the second half of the 19th century, the question of the need to re-equip the army was acute. "The painful experience of the Eastern War," Milyutin noted, "showed the urgent need for fundamental changes in our artillery and in the armament of our troops."

Troop Training Transformation
Major changes in military affairs, combat experience gained during the wars of the second half of the 19th century, the introduction of new, more advanced weapons required an increase in the combat training of troops. The task was to teach the troops only what was needed in the war.

Introduction of universal conscription
The international situation in the late 60s - the increased militarization of Prussia, an increase in the number of all European armies, and then the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 that broke out. - made it possible to re-raise the question of the introduction of all-class military service.

The military reforms of the 1860s and 1870s were of progressive significance and affected all aspects of military command and organization of troops. They contributed to the creation of a mass army of a modern type, strengthening and increasing its combat capability.

The problem of creating a trained reserve was solved. The War Ministry was freed from resolving military administrative issues of a local nature. As a result of the reform, the department exercised only general management and control over the activities of the district. The transformations of the central and local administration created a fairly clear-cut organization of the military ministry, eliminated excessive centralization in administration, and increased the efficiency of command and control of troops.

Big changes were made to the principle of army deployment. The new system of organization of troops was a step forward in comparison with the previous one. According to the new “Regulations”, in the event of war, the army could triple in size without resorting to the formation of new tactical units, which was important for the speed of deployment and the reduction of mobilization time. The training of recruits, both in peacetime and in wartime, began to be entrusted to the reserve troops, while earlier the field troops dealt with this issue.

Transformations in the system of military educational institutions have raised the general educational and special training of Russian servicemen. By January 01 (13), 1877, 11,626 people graduated from cadet schools alone. The shortage of officers has been significantly reduced. The changes that have taken place in the field of combat training of troops were of great practical importance. The Suvorov principle "to bring training closer to action in combat conditions" was revived.

The Russian army was re-equipped with rifled small arms and artillery. However, this process was slow and by the beginning of the 1980s had not yet been fully completed. A serious drawback of small arms was its multi-system nature, which created great difficulties in combat conditions. The field artillery still lacked long-range guns.

During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 - 1878. The Russian army had to fight with the enemy, who received more modern models of small arms and artillery. This war was a serious test of the military reforms of the 60-70s of the XIX century.

The manning reform carried out in 1874 made it possible to significantly increase the number of troops. If in 1874 there were 29,174 generals and officers and 742,465 soldiers in the entire army, then in 1877 their number was increased to 35,614 generals and officers and 1,512,998 soldiers, of which 878,226 people served in the field army . Thus, the number of troops doubled. As a result of mobilization, 372 thousand soldiers and non-commissioned officers were called up. The total strength of the army was brought up to 1,548,432 men.

Thanks to the reform of the military district system, mobilization was carried out in the shortest possible time. If in 1859 it took 6 months, then in 1877 it fluctuated in individual districts from 9 to 25 days. Training was conducted on the territory of the military districts, reserve and reserve troops were created.

The re-equipment of the Russian army with more advanced weapons, the development of railways, wire telegraph, and new engineering means contributed to the further development of new forms of combat operations. Thus, during the performance of strategic maneuvers, the speed of concentration of forces in a decisive direction increased. Positive changes have also affected the ability of the Russian army to carry out tactical military techniques. The transition to rifled breech-loading and long-range weapons put an end to deep formations and led to a wider use of rifle chains.

The Russian army turned out to be capable of solving such complex tasks as crossing the Danube, crossing the Balkans in winter, storming Kars, fighting on Shipka and other operations that were a vivid example of the high combat skill of Russian soldiers.

The development of communications, and in particular the use of the telegraph, required changes in the methods of command. The role of headquarters as governing bodies has increased.

At the same time, the experience of the war showed that the creation of a mass army and equipping it with new equipment required further improvement of the armed forces. The organization of the rear of the army turned out to be a weak point. In addition, the Russian troops did not use enough engineering tools. The war showed that it was more correct to use reserves to reinforce active units, and not to train in the rear. In the same period, a discrepancy between the statutory tactical principles and the level of development of weapons was revealed.

After accession to the throne in 1881, Alexander III, who was an opponent of military reform, created a special commission chaired by Adjutant General P.E. This happened immediately after the departure of D. A. Milyutin from the post of Minister of War. However, the commission, having received the direct task of revising the system of central, local and field administration, was forced to admit that the military reform had fully justified itself, and the existing shortcomings were the result of a retreat from the spirit and ideas of D. A. Milyutin.

The structure of the central military administration, as well as the military district system, created by the progressive minister of war, were not only preserved by Alexander III, but also operate, in their essence, to the present day.

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1 Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 1802-2002. In 3 vols. T. 1. M., 2002. S. 341.
2 Ibid. S. 342.
3 Ibid. S. 345.
4 Ibid.
5 Russian archive. 1872. No. 2. S. 337-344.
6 Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 1802-2002. In 3 vols. T. 1. M., 2002. S. 346.

One of Milyutin's first reforms was the reorganization of the central military administration system and the creation of territorial bodies in the form of district headquarters (the creation of a military district system).

The creation of a coherent system of local command and control of troops was the most urgent task, without which all further transformations in the army were impossible. Until the sixties of the 19th century, army headquarters performed both command and administrative and supply functions in relation to subordinate military formations. The corps headquarters were supposed to do the same. In fact, the headquarters could not effectively perform either one or the other functions, especially if the units subordinate to them were dispersed in different provinces.

In May 1862, Milyutin submitted proposals to Alexander II under the heading "Main grounds for the proposed structure of military administration by districts." This document was based on the following provisions:

1. Destroy the division into armies and corps in peacetime, consider the division as the highest tactical unit.

2. Divide the territory of the entire state into several military districts.

3. Put a chief at the head of the district, who will be entrusted with the supervision of the active troops and command of the local troops, and also entrust him with the management of all local military institutions.

Thus, Milyutin proposed the creation of a territorial, district system, in which supply and logistical functions were assigned to the headquarters of the district, and operational command was concentrated in the hands of divisional commanders. The new system significantly simplified military administration and eliminated the excessive centralization of the War Department.

In accordance with these plans, it was indicated the need to create 15 military districts: Finland, St. Petersburg, Baltic (Riga), Northwestern (Vilna), Kingdom of Poland, Southwestern (Kiev), Southern (Odessa), Moscow, Kharkov, Upper Volga ( Kazan), Lower Volga (Saratov), ​​Caucasian (Tiflis), Orenburg, West Siberian (Omsk), East Siberian (Irkutsk).

The structure of the main district administration was to include: the General Command and Headquarters, the District Quartermaster, the Artillery Directorate, the Engineering Directorate and the Medical and Hospital Directorate.

Already in 1862, the Warsaw, Kiev, Vilna and Odessa military districts were established instead of the First Army. Following this, in August 1864, the “Regulations on Military Districts” were approved, on the basis of which all military units and military institutions located in the district were subordinate to the commander of the district troops. Thus, he became the sole boss. In the border districts, the Commander was entrusted with the duties of a governor-general. All military and civil power was concentrated in his face.

In 1864, 6 more military districts were created: Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Kharkov and Kazan. And in subsequent years, the Caucasian, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian military districts were formed. Each district was at the same time a body of military command and military administration. This made it possible to promptly command troops and ensured the rapid deployment of the army in the event of war.

Along with the reform of local military administration in 1862-1867. the reorganization of the War Ministry was also taking place. The main problem of the existing structure was the lack of a unified management, which was paradoxically combined with the centralization of the department brought to the point of absurdity.

In 1862, two main directorates were created: artillery and engineering, and in 1863, the department of the general staff was reorganized. It was merged with the military topographic depot and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff and received the name of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Later, in connection with the introduction of the military district system, in 1866 the main department of the general staff and the inspection department were merged into one department called the General Staff.

In 1868, the transformation of the War Department was completed, and on January 1, 1869, the new "Regulations on the War Department" came into effect.

According to the "Regulations", the Ministry of War consisted of the imperial Headquarters, the military council, the main military court, the office of the Ministry of War, the General Staff and seven main departments (quartermaster, artillery, engineering, military medical, military educational institutions, military ship, irregular troops), as well as the office of the inspector general of the cavalry, the inspector of rifle battalions and the committee on the wounded.

The rights of the Minister of War were significantly expanded. All branches of military land administration passed under his command. However, on a number of issues that were under the jurisdiction of the military council, the minister made decisions not alone, but as the chairman of this body. Despite the fact that the Minister of War concentrated all the threads of military command in his hands, the troops themselves were not completely subordinate to him, since the heads of the military districts reported directly to the tsar as commander in chief of the army.

The powers of the Military Council were also changed: its duties and composition were expanded, a number of committees were formed: military codification, military training, military hospital and military prison, as well as a committee for the organization and formation of troops. In addition to legislative and economic issues, the function of inspecting troops was also transferred to the jurisdiction of the Military Council.

On the whole, the undertaken reorganization of the central military administration was of great progressive significance. At the same time, it also contained a number of weaknesses:

1. The new structure of the General Staff infringed on the powers of the General Staff itself.

2. The primacy of the Minister of War over the military court and the prosecutor was contrary to the democratic principle of the separation of powers: in fact, the judiciary was subordinate to the representative of the executive branch.

3. The subordination of medical institutions to the chiefs of local troops, and not to the main military medical department, had a negative effect on the establishment of medical practice in the army.

Simultaneously with the military reform, in 1868, the "Regulations on the field command and control of troops in wartime" was developed. According to this document, the troops in the theater of operations formed one or more armies, each of which was headed by a commander in chief who was directly subordinate to the emperor. The heads of the military districts were engaged in supplying the troops with all the necessary resources and were accountable to the commander in chief of the army.

On the basis of the "Regulations ..." the structure of the field command of the army was significantly simplified, the relationship between the commander-in-chief and the minister of war was clarified. The disadvantages of the introduced order were the possible presence of several commanders-in-chief with the same rights, as well as the absence of a military communications department.

As noted, the reorganization of the military administration “...with amazing speed transformed the entire military administration from top to bottom according to one harmonious, logically corresponding system. Giving proper unity to the higher administration of the ministry and granting to the district authorities, together with the decentralization of the executive power of the ministry, the necessary independence in resolving local issues of administration, poured new vitality into the administrative mechanism, which gave all its actions the speed and energy so necessary in military administration.

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1 Dobrovolsky A. Fundamentals of the organization of the central military administration in Russia. SPb., 1901. S. 189.

In the 60s of the nineteenth century, a military judicial reform was carried out in the Russian army, the essence of which was to introduce new, more humane views on soldier service, improve the morale of the army, and form a sense of duty and honor among military personnel.

During the implementation of the reform, the following were introduced: the “Disciplinary Charter”, the “Charter of the Internal Service”, the “Military Charter on Punishments” and the “Military Court Charter”, which set out the basics of the military court case. These documents emphasized that military service is the highest form of service to the Motherland.

“Military discipline,” said the Disciplinary Regulations, “consists in strict and precise observance of the rules prescribed by military laws. Therefore, she obliges to strictly observe servility, to accurately and unquestioningly carry out the orders of superiors, to maintain order in the entrusted team, to conscientiously fulfill the duties of service and not to leave misconduct and omissions of subordinates without penalty.

The statutes proclaimed the protection of the honor and dignity of a soldier. The main offense was the violation of duty. In 1863, gauntlets, whips, branding and other corporal punishments that dishonored human dignity were abolished in the army, but the rods were kept as a "temporary measure." In the same year, the “Regulations on the Protection of Military Discipline and Disciplinary Penalties” were approved, and a court of the society of officers was established, giving them the right to remove from their midst those unworthy of wearing a military uniform.

In 1867, a new military-judicial charter began to operate. With its introduction, the Main Military Judicial Directorate was created, which was part of the Military Ministry, the Main Military Court and, under it, the Chief Military Prosecutor. The charter provided for three types of military courts: regimental courts, military district courts and the Main Military Court, located in St. Petersburg.

The new organization of legal proceedings provided for publicity, but at the same time it should be noted that the military courts were dependent on the military authorities, which deprived them of their independence. This was especially true of the regimental courts, which were completely subordinate to the regimental commanders, which created certain prerequisites for administrative arbitrariness.

Transformations in the governing bodies, improvement of technology, changes in the combat training of the troops demanded from the officer not only knowledge of military service, but also general, as well as special education, high mental development and appropriate moral qualities.

In the pre-reform period, the staffing of the army with officers was carried out at the expense of graduates of cadet corps and special military schools (artillery, engineering, etc.), which accounted for about 30% of the officers. The main body of the officer corps (about 60%) was staffed by cadets and volunteers, who were entitled to a grace period of service when they were awarded the first officer rank. They were enrolled in the regiments after passing a simple exam and, after serving for two years, with a positive assessment, they received an officer rank.

In addition, the army was staffed by non-commissioned officers who had served in the army for ten to twelve years and passed a simple exam (up to 10%). The government resorted to the last measure mainly during the war, since with the production of officers they were given personal nobility.

During the Crimean War, serious shortcomings were revealed in the system of officer training. The question arose of reorganizing military educational institutions in order to improve the quality of officer training and increase the number of candidates of the appropriate level.

In the course of the reorganization of military educational institutions, ineffective cadet corps (with the exception of the Page and Finland Corps), which created an unnecessary burden on the military budget, were liquidated. Special classes of cadet corps, where people who had a secondary education were admitted, were transformed into military schools with a two- or three-year term of study. On the basis of the general education classes of the cadet corps, military gymnasiums were opened with a seven-year term of study (preparatory and six basic classes), which were educational institutions that were advanced in their organization and program. Their graduates then entered military schools.

An average of 460 people graduated from military schools annually. However, the army continued to lack officers. In this regard, another type of military educational institutions was created - cadet schools with a two-year term of study. They were created with the aim of "delivering to the lower ranks of the regular troops from among the chief officer's children, as well as to the officers from the nobility, the scientific and drill education necessary for an officer." The cadet schools admitted persons who had been trained in the amount of four classes of a secondary general education school. These schools were subordinate to the chiefs of staff of the military districts. Military gymnasiums with a four-year term of study were also opened, preparing for admission to the cadet schools.

Junker schools served as the main source of replenishment of the officer corps. In 1869, 641 of them were released, and in 1870 - 829 people with the right to be promoted to officers.)

Various schools of the military department also functioned in the system of military educational institutions, preparing gunsmiths, pyrotechnicians, clerks, topographers, draftsmen, engravers, etc. Their graduates were required to serve as lower ranks in their specialty from 10 to 12 years.

The training of non-commissioned officers was also carried out in separate units and regiments, in special training teams or company schools with a two-year training period. Classes were held in them in the period between camp gatherings. Candidates for non-commissioned officers, in addition to reading and writing and general education subjects, studied military regulations, the organization of troops, got acquainted with military criminal laws and other issues of military service. Thanks to the measures taken, the army received a significant number of non-commissioned officers.

Serious attention was also given to the training of teaching staff for military schools.

After a thorough check, the most trained teachers were allowed to teach in military educational institutions. The advantage was given to professors of military sciences, graduates of academies, as well as civilian teachers, who often worked part-time in military educational institutions. Their appointment was preceded by an examination and trial lectures. Personnel for military educational institutions were trained by the Main Pedagogical Institute, pedagogical institutes at universities and pedagogical courses opened at the 2nd military gymnasium in St. Petersburg, where people with completed higher education were enrolled. Those who completed the courses were required to serve three years in military gymnasiums.

In the period under review, tireless pedagogical work was going on in the department of military educational institutions. A special printed organ was published - "Pedagogical collection". According to the apt expression of the famous teacher D.I. Tikhomirov, the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions "served as the center of the entire pedagogical movement." As a result of the measures taken, the quality of teaching and upbringing in specialized secondary military schools has improved significantly. According to the authorities, the officers graduating from these institutions were well trained.

The training of senior officers was carried out at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, the Nikolaev Engineering, Mikhailovskaya Artillery and Medical-Surgical Academies. In 1867, the Alexander Military Law Academy was also opened.

In the 60s there were some changes in the regulations on the academies. The requirements for admission to the Academy of the General Staff were increased. Only officers who had served in the troops in combat positions for at least four years began to be allowed to enter the entrance exams. The Mikhailovsky Artillery and Nikolaev Engineering Academy began to be admitted only to persons who had served in the ranks for at least two years.

Particular attention in the academies was paid to improving the quality of teaching, the study of military art, taking into account the experience of recent wars. Much attention was paid to practical exercises.

The reorganization of military educational institutions made it possible to significantly increase the composition of the officer corps and raise its educational level. If in 1865 there were 24 military educational institutions in Russia with a capacity of 1032 people, then in 1870-1871. there were already 52 of them, and during the specified period 1477 officers were trained.

However, in the course of the reform, a reserve of officers for the reserve troops was not created. Education was still received mainly by people from the nobility. For representatives of other classes, access to military educational institutions was practically closed.

In the second half of the 19th century, the question of the need to re-equip the army was acute. "The hard experience of the Eastern War," Milyutin noted, "showed the urgent need for fundamental changes in our artillery and in the armament of our troops."

During the war, an undeniable advantage of rifled weapons over smooth-bore weapons was discovered. Immediately after the end of the Crimean War, work began on rearming the army with a more effective type of weapon. “Russia cannot,” said one of the reports of that time from the Main Artillery Directorate to the Minister of War, “and it should not lag behind other paramount European powers in the radical rearmament of its army, no matter how sensitive donations this may require from the state.” The Artillery Directorate was entrusted with the duty to study all systems of rifled weapons, to supply the Russian army with them "at the lowest possible cost and within the shortest possible time." For this purpose, the Armory Commission of the Artillery Committee was formed.

During the second half of the 19th century, there was a continuous process of arming the army with more modern models of rifled small arms. By the beginning of 1865, all infantry, except for a number of divisions that were part of the Caucasian army, was armed with 6-line rifles with a firing range of 1200 steps. And yet, Russia continued to lag behind the advanced armies of Western Europe in the field of army rearmament.

The weapons commission was instructed to quickly find a sample of a rifle that met the latest military requirements. This work took into account the experience of recent wars (the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the Danish War of 1864 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866).

The first example of a breech-loading rifle adopted by the Russian army in 1866 was the Terry-Norman rifle. The following year, the 6-line needle rifle of the Hamburg master Karle entered service. After its modernization, Russian gunsmiths created a sample of a needle rifle, which differed significantly from the original. The new model had a rate of fire of 7-8 rounds per minute, a firing range of 1200 steps.

Meanwhile, the process of improving the domestic gun business continued. At the end of the 60s, the army received a small-caliber breech-loading rifle of the Berdan No. 1 system with a folding bolt, developed by the American designer X. Berdan. Later, the rifle was improved by Russian officers A.P. Gorlov and K.I. Gunnius. More than 30 amendments were made to it, and in addition, the shutter system was changed (instead of a folding one - a sliding one). She gained fame as the Berdan rifle number 2.

For the Berdan rifle No. 2, Russian designers created a new cartridge with a lead bullet in a paper wrapper that protected the bore from lead. This bullet was borrowed by other countries. The new rifle had a range of 1,500 paces and a rate of fire of 8-9 rounds per minute. For the first time, a four-sided bayonet was adopted for it, replacing the previously three-sided one. There were three types of this rifle: infantry, dragoon and Cossack, differing in length and weight.

Unfortunately, the government was unable to provide the army with the necessary number of new-style rifles. As a result, before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Russian army was armed with several different models of rifles. So, out of the 48 infantry divisions available, 27 were armed with the Krnka rifle, 16 with Berdan small-caliber rifles, and 5 divisions located in the Caucasus with Karle rifles. Before the Russian-Turkish war, only a third of the infantry was armed with the Berdan rifle No. 2.

Simultaneously with the re-equipment of the Russian army with small arms, the military department took measures to improve artillery. In the 50s of the 19th century, artillery was armed with smooth-bore, muzzle-loading guns, mostly copper, on wooden carriages. Their range did not exceed 800-1000 steps, the rate of fire was 1-2 rounds per minute.

The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 pointed to the need to re-equip the artillery with breech-loading rifled guns with wedge-shaped breechblocks.

But Russian artillery scientists designed new models of guns for various purposes, in many respects superior to their foreign counterparts.

Professor of the Artillery Academy N.V. Mayevsky, who wrote outstanding works on ballistics, designed guns that surpassed foreign ones in their qualities. Another professor of the same academy, A.V. Gadolin created the theory of attaching guns with special rings, which made it possible to increase the power and range of artillery. Professor I.A. Vyshnegradsky invented a method for making gunpowder, which had improved ballistic properties. Research by D.K. Chernova, N.V. Kalakutsky, A.S. Lavrov gave the opportunity to put on a scientific basis the manufacture of steel tools not only in Russia, but throughout the world.

Thanks to the discovery of P.M. Obukhov in Russia, for the first time in the world, gun barrels from cast steel began to be produced. The steel rifled gun developed by Obukhov received the first prize at the World Industrial Exhibition in 1862. However, its introduction into the troops was slow.

In 1873, the B.C., designed by a Russian inventor, entered service. Baranovsky, the world's first rapid-fire cannon. She had a recoil device and was equipped with an optical sight. Milyutin wrote that in terms of the number of inventions in the field of artillery, “we have achieved such successful results that we can safely consider ourselves ahead of other states persistently pursuing the same goals. England and France do not have steel guns at all, while Prussia and Belgium order guns for themselves from the same Krupp factory according to our Russian drawings.

During 1867 - 1869. the re-equipment of artillery was basically over. Field artillery received new breech-loading steel and bronze guns. However, by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. the production of long-range field artillery and large-caliber steel guns for fortress artillery was still not established.

The re-equipment of the Russian army with more advanced weapons and artillery had a direct impact on the development of new forms of combat operations. Thus, the transition to rifled breech-loading and long-range weapons put an end to deep infantry formations. The tactics of rifle chains finally took shape and received development.

During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The peculiarities of the infantry's action were dense chains with a continuous infusion of reserves into the attacking chain. Received the development of shooting over the head of their own and from closed positions. In this regard, the requirements for both small arms and artillery weapons have increased. In the field of small arms, the search for new solutions was directed towards reducing calibers and ensuring the density and range of fire, in the field of artillery - along the line of developing howitzer artillery and field mortars.

The rearmament of the army was impossible without the development of domestic industry. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories were reconstructed, large steel plants were built - Obukhov and Motovilikhinsky. In St. Petersburg in 1869, the largest cartridge factory in Europe was built, equipped with the best machines and machine tools at that time, some of which were developed by Russian artillery officers and technicians. In addition, there were workshops for the production of cartridges in St. Petersburg, Kyiv, Warsaw, Libau. At the same time, the quality of products was higher than American and English.

The rearmament of the Russian army lasted about 20 years, but by the end of the 70s of the XIX century it had not yet been completed. Despite the outstanding inventions of Russian scientists and engineers, due to the industrial backwardness of the country, the lack of financial allocations for the army and the conservatism of the ruling circles, things went slowly. The Russian army continued to lag behind the foreign level of artillery technology and the requirements of military practice.

Major changes in military affairs, as well as combat experience gained during the wars of the second half of the 19th century and the introduction of new, more advanced weapons, required an increase in the combat training of troops. The task was to teach the troops only what was needed in the war.

Crimean War 1853-1856 revealed the imperfection of combat training. Describing the system of drill training in the army, Milyutin wrote: “In military affairs, which Nicholas I was engaged in with such passion, concern for order and discipline prevailed. They were not engaged in the essential improvement of the troops, not in adapting them to a combat mission, but only chasing the outside, for a brilliant view at parades, pedantry, observing countless petty formalities that dulled human reason and killed a truly military spirit.

With the advent of new forms of combat operations associated with the development of technology, personnel began to be required to have a conscious attitude to their duties, to show initiative. As a result of this, solitary training is being strengthened and changed, aimed at training the soldier for more independent actions.

Hence, in order to improve the combat training of the troops, it was considered necessary to pay special attention to the practical side. The training of troops was required to be carried out in conditions close to combat. For this purpose, training maneuvers, firing were arranged, engineering and sapper business were studied.

In 1862, a special “Committee on the Organization and Formation of Troops” was created under the Ministry of War, which developed and published the “Military Regulations on Infantry Service in Combat Service”, where much attention was paid to single training.

In 1863, an order was issued for the training of recruits, which ordered them to be taught exercises with a gun, loading and shooting, the rules of loose and rank order. The importance of training in target shooting, drill and fire training, and sapper work was pointed out.

Before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 - 1878. a special commission formed by the Committee for the Arrangement of Troops gave preference to firing from loose formation, based on the experience of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. At the same time, shooting from a close formation was recommended only for units not exceeding a company. The main conclusion drawn by the commission was that the rifle chain had acquired a dominant role in the infantry combat formation.

In the "Manual for the training of field troops in sapper business" of 1871, it was recommended that all units of the infantry and foot artillery during the summer musters practice in arranging shelters from enemy shots.

The engineering troops had sufficient training. In their composition, new formations were created, caused by technical progress: railway battalions, aeronautic detachments, telegraph companies, etc. In artillery, training was directed to the maximum use of rifled guns.

The Committee for the Arrangement and Formation of Troops took many measures to improve the material base of combat training, to build training camps and training grounds. It was planned to move from tent camps to barracks. By the end of the 1970s, 34 training camps had been built. In the summer, camps were regularly held, where all types of troops were trained in joint actions. Particular attention was paid to the aimed shooting of infantry and artillery.

The new principles of military training required the development of the physical qualities of a soldier. Since the beginning of the 60s, training in gymnastics and fencing has been introduced. In almost all military units, gymnastic towns were built, fortifications were built with ditches and wolf pits, which the soldiers were obliged to storm in full combat ammunition. Soldiers were trained in sapper business.

Much attention was paid to the spread of literacy among the soldiers, because. the combat training of literate soldiers was more successful than that of illiterate ones. In addition, literacy contributed to the development of the moral and mental qualities of a soldier. In pre-reform times, only 10% of soldiers could read and write. This created difficulties in training a recruit in military affairs. To meet the need for competent soldiers, company schools began to be created in the army. The role of teachers was performed by platoon and company commanders.

The Ministry of War showed concern for the supply of military libraries with literature. Charters, manuals, instructions, instructions and other official documents were sent to military libraries free of charge, and certain funds were allocated to them for the purchase of the necessary books. Magazines for soldiers were widely published - "Soldier's Conversations" and "Readings for Soldiers". Many activities carried out in the army concerned the improvement of the life of the lower ranks. Measures were taken to improve the food of the soldiers, the improvement of the barracks, etc.

The requirements for the professional training of officers and non-commissioned officers have increased. It included classes in the field of general education disciplines, a deeper study of special sciences, and the development of practical skills.

In 1867, by order of the military department, training teams were created to train non-commissioned officers. The duration of their studies was two years.

Tactical exercises and exercises played an important role in combat training. Their goal was to improve field training in various types of combat in conditions close to combat. In 1875, in the order of the War Department, systematic exercises were introduced to solve written and oral tactical problems.

In 1874, the Main Committee for the Arrangement and Education of Troops issued an instruction to change the training program for young officers. According to the new rules, they were to be distributed among companies and squadrons and pay the main attention to their duty - the training of the lower ranks. During the camp time, young officers learned to work with a map, navigate the situation, apply to the terrain, correctly draw up and draw up combat documents.

A serious obstacle to the combat training of troops was the insufficiency of funds allocated to finance the War Ministry. For this reason, the department was forced to limit the conduct of maneuvers, camp gatherings, firing and other training activities.

On the whole, the military reforms of the 1960s and 1970s significantly improved the combat training of troops and brought training closer to the nature of hostilities (maneuvers, practical firing, sapper work). However, it should be noted that, despite the efforts of advanced military leaders, by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. troops were not fully covered by the new system of education and combat training.

The main drawback of troop training was the inconsistency of tactical principles with the level of development of firearms, which was expressed in the preservation of a close formation in the infantry, as well as in the insufficiency of using the capabilities of new types of weapons, which significantly reduced the combat training of the army. This was explained, first of all, by the fact that the supporters of parade parades and drill wanted to see in the reforms only some renewal of the old order.

The international situation in the late 60s - the increased militarization of Prussia, an increase in the number of all European armies, and then the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 that broke out. - made it possible to re-raise the question of the introduction of all-class military service.

To implement the planned measures, at the end of 1870, two commissions were formed: one - to develop a draft charter on military service, the other - on the issue of reserve, local, reserve troops and state militia. Both commissions worked under the chairmanship of the Chief of the General Staff, General Heiden, and under the general direction of Milyutin.

A number of important events were to be held. First, to reduce or disband as much as possible those parts of the troops that had no use in the event of war, such as, for example, the internal guard corps, military workers and disabled companies. Secondly, to turn the reserve troops, intended for training recruits and replenishing the active army, into a "combat reserve". As for the reserve troops, in wartime they were given the task of training recruits and replenishing them with active and reserve troops, who in peacetime had a well-formed cadre.

In addition, the question of the application of the territorial system in Russia was discussed. Its essence was that each part of the troops is permanently located in any one area and is recruited from the local population, both in peacetime and during mobilization.

Recognizing the impossibility of the full application of the territorial system in Russia, the commission came to the conclusion: “In the organization of the army, from the beginnings of the territorial system, apply only what, according to the conditions of our Fatherland, can be usefully applied, while maintaining the possibility of moving and concentrating troops, but allowing constant, from certain districts, recruiting each part of the army in peacetime and replenishing it to military strength when brought to martial law.

The question of the people's militia was also considered. However, Milyutin believed that it could play its role only if it consisted of people who were sufficiently trained, capable of replacing troops intended for internal service, local defense. Periodic military collections, given the vast territory and the weak development of railways, would cause great damage to the national economy.

To discuss the proposals prepared by the commission, at the beginning of 1873, on the initiative of Milyutin, a secret meeting was convened under the chairmanship of Alexander II. On it, the opposition tried to destroy the hated system of military command and organization of the army. And yet, after a detailed discussion, it was decided that “with the real huge armaments of Europe, with the speed of mobilization of troops that some states have achieved, it is impossible for Russia to stop at the current level of development of its military forces. It was recognized as necessary to significantly strengthen the composition of the army and introduce many changes in the organization of troops, taking measures to quickly mobilize forces and concentrate them, to bring the material and technical parts to a size that would correspond to the strength of the army determined for the future.

The decision of the secret meeting regarding the organization of military administration stated that “the existing system of military district administration should be preserved on the same basis; part of the field troops located in the districts closest to the western border should also be united in peacetime into corps, consisting of two or three infantry divisions with an appropriate number of cavalry and artillery. The Minister of War had to make a lot of efforts to reject the demands of the opposition, who considered it necessary to subordinate the corps commanders directly to the emperor, which would mean the destruction of the military districts.

Thus, the military districts and the entire system of military administration created by Milyutin were preserved.

A fierce struggle also flared up in the State Council when discussing the draft law on military service. Some of the council members considered this reform premature, others demanded privileges for persons of a certain category. And yet, on January 1 (13), 1874, the “Charter on All-Class Military Service” was published.

The "Charter" stated that the defense of the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian subject, and that the entire male population over the age of 20, without distinction of class, is subject to military service. Some of the conscripts were enrolled in active service with subsequent transfer to the army reserve and the militia, while the other part immediately entered the militia. It was decided by lottery.

The total term of service in the army was set at 15 years, of which 6 years in active service and 9 years in reserve, in the navy - 10 years, of which 7 years were in active service and 3 years in reserve. Provided extensive benefits for education. Persons who graduated from educational institutions could act as volunteers for reduced terms of service. For conscripts with higher education, the term of service was set at 6 months (14 years in the reserve), with an initial one - 4 years (in the reserve - 11 years). Postponements were allowed until the end of education and a reduction in the term of active service.

Benefits were also established according to family and property status: the only sons and the only breadwinners of the family were not called. Deferrals for property status were granted to owners of land plots and commercial and industrial enterprises with at least 5 workers. According to the charter, the replacement and hiring of military personnel was prohibited.

The charter of 1874, which extended service in the army to all classes, still did not fully ensure universal military service. Thus, a significant part of the "foreign" population (of the Transcaucasian Territory, the Turkestan Military District, the Primorsky and Amur Regions, as well as the northern districts of the Yenisei, Tobolsk and Tambov provinces) was excluded from military service. In addition, the Cossacks, the population of Finland, the North Caucasus, the Astrakhan province, the Turgai and Ural regions, as well as the “nomadic foreigners” of Siberia, had to serve military service on special grounds. Persons of the clergy, doctors, teachers, scientists and artists were also exempted from conscription. For all Muslims, military service was temporarily replaced by a monetary tax.

The charter on military service made it possible to increase the size of the army, to create a trained reserve necessary for the deployment of the army in wartime. Thanks to its introduction, the size of the cadre army increased from 770 thousand in 1874 to 1,360 thousand in 1914. Among the progressive moments of the new law was the fact that it abolished the main privileges for the nobility, granted back in the reign of Catherine II. Establishment of benefits education stimulated the development of enlightenment. The introduction of universal military service ensured the transformation of the Russian armed forces into a modern mass army.

They can be conditionally divided into two parts: organizational and technological.

Organizational reforms

In August 1864, the “Regulations on military districts” were approved, on the basis of which all military units and military institutions located in the district were subordinate to the Commander of the District Troops, thus he became the sole chief, and not an inspector, as was planned before (at the same time, all artillery units in the district reported directly to the chief of artillery of the district). In the border districts, the Commander was entrusted with the duties of the Governor-General and all military and civil power was concentrated in his person. The structure of the district administration remained unchanged.

In 1864, 6 more military districts were created: Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Kharkov and Kazan. In subsequent years, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian military districts were formed.

In parallel, there was a reform of the military ministry itself. According to the new staff, the composition of the War Department was reduced by 327 officers and 607 soldiers. Significantly reduced the volume of correspondence. As a positive, one can also note the fact that the Minister of War concentrated all the threads of military command in his hands, however, the troops were not completely subordinate to him, since the heads of the military districts depended directly on the king, who headed the supreme command of the armed forces.

At the same time, the organization of the central military command contained a number of other weaknesses:

• The structure of the General Staff was built in such a way that little space was allocated to the functions of the General Staff itself.
• The subordination of the chief military court and the prosecutor to the Minister of War meant the subordination of the judiciary to a representative of the executive branch.
• The subordination of medical institutions not to the main military medical department, but to the heads of local troops, had a negative effect on the establishment of medical affairs in the army.

Conclusions of the organizational reforms of the armed forces carried out in the -70s of the XIX century:

• The destruction of army corps and the continued division of infantry battalions into rifle and line companies had a negative impact on the combat training of troops.
• The reorganization of the War Office ensured the relative unity of the military administration.

1. Protection of the throne and fatherland is the sacred duty of every Russian subject. The male population, without distinction of condition, is subject to military service.
2. Monetary redemption from military service and replacement by a hunter is not allowed. …
3. …
10. Admission to the service by conscription is decided by lot, which is taken out once for a lifetime. Persons who, according to the number of the lot drawn by them, are not subject to admission to the permanent troops, are enrolled in the militia.
11. Every year only the age of the population is called to the lot, namely, young people who, by January 1st of the year in which the selection is made, have passed twenty years of age.
12. …
17. The total term of service in the ground forces for those entering by lot is determined at 15 years, of which 6 years of active service and 9 years in reserve ...
18. The total service life in the fleet is defined as 10 years, of which 7 years of active service and 3 years in reserve.
19. …
36. The state militia is made up of all the male population, not included in the permanent troops, but capable of carrying weapons, from the age of conscription to 43 years of age inclusive. Persons under this age and persons dismissed from the reserve of the army and navy are not exempted from conscription.

Technological reforms

6-line rifle arr. 1856

Berdan rifle No. 2

In 1856, a new type of infantry weapon was developed: a 6-line (15.24 mm) muzzle-loading primer rifle. In 1862, more than 260 thousand people were armed with it. A significant part of the rifles was produced in Germany and Belgium. By the beginning of 1865, all infantry had been re-equipped with rifles of the 1856 model. At the same time, work continued to improve rifles, and in 1868 they adopted the 10.75-mm Berdan rifle under a unitary cartridge, and in 1870 - its modified version (No. 2). As a result, by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the entire Russian army was armed with the latest breech-loading rifles of reduced caliber.

The introduction of rifled, muzzle-loading guns began in 1860. The 3.42-inch Maievsky 4-pound rifled guns were adopted by the field artillery, surpassing those previously produced both in firing range and in accuracy.

In 1866, armament for field artillery was approved, according to which all batteries of foot and horse artillery should have rifled, breech-loading guns. 1/3 of the foot batteries are to be armed with 9-pounders, and all other batteries of foot and horse artillery with 4-pounders. For the rearmament of field artillery, 1200 guns were required. By 1870, the re-equipment of field artillery was completely completed, and by 1871 there were 448 guns in reserve.

In 1870, rapid-fire 10-barreled Gatling and 6-barreled Baranovsky guns with a rate of fire of 200 rounds per minute were adopted by artillery brigades. In 1872, the Baranovsky 2.5-inch rapid-fire cannon was adopted, which implemented the basic principles of modern rapid-fire guns.

Thus, over the course of 12 years (from 1862 to 1874), the number of batteries increased from 138 to 300, and the number of guns from 1104 to 2400. In 1874, there were 851 guns in stock, a transition was made from wooden carriages to iron ones.

Military Education Reform

New outfit

The renewal of the army began with changes in military uniforms. Only in the first year of the reign of Alexander II, 62 orders were issued regarding changes in uniforms. Such activity caused bewilderment in society:

The only transformations for which the new sovereign immediately set about consisted in changing uniforms. Everyone who valued the fate of the fatherland looked at this with sorrow. They asked themselves in amazement: is there really nothing more important than uniforms in those difficult circumstances in which we find ourselves? Is this really all that has matured in the thoughts of the new king during his long tenure as heir? They recalled verses written, it seems, at the beginning of the reign of Alexander I, and applying them to the present, they repeated:

I.INTRODUCTION

The state of the pre-reform army was determined by the socio-economic situation that prevailed in Russia at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. The first half of the 19th century was characterized by a crisis in the feudal-serf system and the formation of new capitalist relations.

The backwardness of the pre-reform economy determined the state of the Russian army and military industry in the middle of the 19th century. The military defeat in the Crimean War left no one in doubt about the need for reforms in the military field.

In 1956, Alexander II appointed General N. O. Sukhozanet as Minister of War and instructed him to carry out reforms, the general had no plan for military reform, all his actions were reduced to cutting the military budget and reducing the army. The king presented his own ideas to him, but most of them concerned changing military uniforms. No more serious steps were taken in the field of military reforms until the appointment of the Minister of War in November 1861. Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin.

II.MAIN PART.

Milyutin presented a detailed plan for military reform to the tsar on January 15, 1862, two months after his appointment. The Minister of War faced two seemingly mutually exclusive tasks: to reduce military spending and at the same time increase the combat power of the army.

He believed that he could achieve these goals by reforming the military administration and reducing the terms of service. The cumbersome control apparatus was expensive and ineffective. And the excessive duration of service led to the fact that the army had insignificant draft reserves, and it was necessary to maintain a large permanent contingent. With a shorter service life, it would be possible to have more trained men in reserve and maintain a smaller army in peacetime.

In addition, he proposed a number of other urgently needed changes. The army needed to improve the training of officers (at that time only a quarter of the officers had a military education), as well as the procedure for appointment to command positions. One of the issues of the report was the reorganization of the military education system.

The most important problem of the reforms was the rearmament of the army.

Much attention was paid in the report to the need to reorganize the military command and create local government bodies - military districts.

At the end of the report, the question was raised about the tasks of the engineering department - the strengthening of state borders and the construction of barracks.

1. Reforms in the field of organization, staffing of the army and command and control.

The implementation of Milyutin's main goal - the creation of a small cadre army, which, if necessary, could be quickly increased by calling up trained people from the reserve, continued throughout the entire military reform.

Already in 1862, the War Department took a number of measures to downsizing the army, mainly due to the reduction of its “non-combat” part - stage teams, work companies, and the internal guard corps (83 thousand people).

In the report of the Ministry of War on 01/15/1862, measures were considered to transform the entire military system, to create a more rational system of military organization in the following areas:

n Turn the reserve troops into a combat reserve, ensure that they replenish the composition of the active troops and free them from the obligation to train recruits in wartime.

n Entrust the training of recruits to the reserve troops, providing them with sufficient personnel.

n All supernumerary "lower ranks" of the reserve and reserve troops, in peacetime, are considered on vacation and drafted into the military. Recruits to replenish the loss in the active troops, and not to form new units from them.

n To form cadres of reserve troops for peacetime, entrusting them with garrison service, disbanding the internal service battalions.

With regard to the organization of infantry and cavalry units, it was indicated that it would be expedient to include 4 companies (and not 5) in the battalion, and 4 battalions in the regiment (and for the internal provinces - 2 battalions), and in order to avoid the formation of new units in case of war, contain them in reduced numbers. It was supposed to establish 3 regular staff for the infantry: personnel, peacetime states and wartime states (personnel accounted for half of the military).

Artillery units were to be organized according to the following principle: for each infantry division, have one artillery brigade of 4 batteries (for divisions of 2 battalions, an artillery brigade of 2 batteries).

However, it was not possible to quickly introduce this organization, and only from 1864, after the suppression of the main centers of the uprising in Poland, was a systematic reorganization of the army and a reduction in the strength of the troops begun.

The following regimental staffings were established: wartime (900 rows per battalion), reinforced civilian (680 rows per battalion), ordinary civilian (500 rows per battalion) and civilian personnel (320 rows per battalion) . The entire infantry amounted to 47 infantry divisions (40 army, 4 grenadier and 3 guards). The division consisted of 4 regiments, a regiment of 3 battalions, a battalion of 4 linear and 1 rifle companies.

Artillery was divided into horse and foot. The foot consisted of 47 artillery brigades (according to the number of divisions), each of 3 batteries of 8 (4) guns. Horse artillery consisted of 4 guards horse batteries and 7 horse artillery brigades, 2 batteries each.

The cavalry consisted of 56 regiments - 4 squadrons each (4 cuirassiers, 20 dragoons, 16 lancers and 16 hussars), which made up 10 cavalry divisions.

The engineering troops consisted of 11 engineer battalions and 6 pontoon semi-battalions.

The active troops included fortress regiments and battalions, as well as 54 fortress artillery companies.

Since 1864, local troops began to include both reserve (now performing the role of reserve troops) and internal service troops (provincial battalions, county, local stage and escort teams).

By 1869, the bringing of troops to the new states was completed. At the same time, the total number of troops in peacetime, compared with 1860, decreased from 899 thousand people. up to 726 thousand people (mainly due to the reduction of the “non-combat” element). And the number of reservists in the reserve increased from 242 to 553 thousand people. At the same time, with the transition to the states of the military, no new units and formations were now formed, and units were deployed at the expense of reservists. All troops could now be understaffed to wartime states in 30-40 days, while in 1859 it took 6 months.

However, the new system of organizing troops also contained a number of shortcomings:

n The organization of the infantry retained the division into line and rifle companies (with the same weapons, there was no point in this).

n Artillery brigades were not included in the infantry divisions, which negatively affected their interaction.

n Of the 3 brigades of the cavalry divisions (hussars, lancers and dragoons), only the dragoons were armed with carbines, and the rest did not have firearms, while the entire European cavalry was armed with pistols.

The main transformation in the field of reorganization of military command and control was military district system.

The creation of a coherent system of local command and control of troops was the most important task facing the War Ministry, without which further transformations in the army were impossible. The need for these transformations was due to the fact that the headquarters of the armies performed both command and administrative and supply functions in relation to subordinate units, similar tasks were assigned to the corps headquarters. In practice, the headquarters could not effectively perform either of these functions, especially if the units subordinate to them were dispersed in different provinces.

In May 1862, Milyutin submitted proposals to Alexander II under the heading "Main grounds for the proposed organization of military administration by districts." This document was based on the following provisions:

n Abolish the peacetime division into armies and corps, consider the division as the highest tactical unit.

n Divide the territory of the entire state into several military districts.

n At the head of the district, appoint a chief, who will be entrusted with the supervision of the active troops and command of the local troops, and also entrust him with the management of all local military institutions.

Thus, Milyutin proposed the creation of a territorial, district system, in which supply and logistical functions were assigned to the headquarters of the district, and operational command was concentrated in the hands of divisional commanders. The new system significantly simplified military administration and eliminated a significant drawback - the extreme centralization of administration in the ministry.

In accordance with this, the need to create 15 military districts was indicated: Finland, St. Petersburg, Baltic (Riga), Northwestern (Vilna), Kingdom of Poland, Southwestern (Kiev), Southern (Odessa), Moscow, Kharkov, Upper Volga (Kazan), Lower Volga (Saratov), ​​Caucasian (Tiflis), Orenburg, West Siberian (Omsk), East Siberian (Irkutsk).

The structure of the main district administration was to include: the General Command and Headquarters, the District Quartermaster, the Artillery Directorate, the Engineering Directorate and the Medical and Hospital Directorate.

Already in the summer of 1862, instead of the First Army, the Warsaw, Kiev and Vilna military districts were established, and at the end of 1862 - Odessa.

In August 1864, the “Regulations on Military Districts” were approved, on the basis of which all military units and military institutions located in the district were subordinate to the Commander of the District Troops, thus he became the sole commander, and not an inspector, as was planned before (at the same time, all artillery units in the district reported directly to the chief of artillery of the district). In the border districts, the Commander was entrusted with the duties of the Governor-General and all military and civil power was concentrated in his person. The structure of the district administration remained unchanged.

In 1864, 6 more military districts were created: Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Kharkov and Kazan. In subsequent years, the Caucasian, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian military districts were formed.

As a result of the organization of military districts, a relatively harmonious system of local military administration was created, eliminating the extreme centralization of the War Ministry, whose functions are now in the implementation of general leadership and supervision. The military districts ensured the rapid deployment of the army in the event of war, and if they were available, it became possible to start drawing up a mobilization schedule.

Along with the reform of local military administration, during the 60s, there was also reorganization of the War Office, which was ripe because there was no unity of control in the Ministry of War and at the same time centralization brought to the point of absurdity dominated. For five years - from 1862 to 1867, the reorganization of the War Department took place.

Already in 1862, two main departments were created: artillery and engineering. These main departments were still headed by members of the imperial family.

In 1863 the Department of the General Staff was reorganized. It was merged with the military topographic depot and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, with the name of its main directorate of the general staff.

In connection with the introduction of the military district system, in 1866 the main department of the general staff and the inspection department were merged into one department called the General Staff. It consisted of six departments, the Asian and ship parts, the military topographic department was located at the General Headquarters, and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff was directly subordinate to the General Headquarters.

In 1868, the transformation of the Ministry of War was completed, and from January 1, 1869, the Regulations on the Ministry of War were introduced, according to which it consisted of the imperial Headquarters, the military council, the main military court, the office of the Ministry of War, the General Staff and seven main departments (quartermaster, artillery, engineering, military medical, military educational institutions, military ships, irregular troops), as well as the departments of the inspector general of the cavalry and the inspector of rifle battalions and the committee on the wounded.

The rights of the Minister of War were significantly expanded. He was the chief commander of all branches of the military land administration, however, on a number of issues that were under the jurisdiction of the military council, he did not lead alone, but only as its chairman.

The military council has also undergone changes. Both the composition and its functions have been expanded. In addition to solving legislative and economic issues, the military council also has jurisdiction over the inspection of troops. Under him, there were a number of committees: military codification, for the organization and formation of troops, military training, military hospital and military prison.

The Artillery Academy and schools were directly subordinate to the Main Artillery Directorate. Under him was an artillery committee, which was in charge of discussing issues related to the theory, technology and practice of artillery and hand weapons, new inventions in this area and the dissemination of scientific knowledge among artillery officers. The head of the main artillery committee was subordinate to the general feldzekhmeister (Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich).

According to the new state, the composition of the War Department was reduced by 327 officers and 607 soldiers. Significantly reduced the volume of correspondence. As a positive, one can also note the fact that the Minister of War concentrated all the threads of military command in his hands, however, the troops were not completely subordinate to him, because. the chiefs of the military districts depended directly on the king, who headed the supreme command of the armed forces.

At the same time, the organization of the central military command contained a number of other weaknesses:

n The structure of the General Staff was built in such a way that little space was allocated to the functions of the General Staff itself.

n The subordination of the chief military court and the prosecutor to the Minister of War meant the subordination of the judiciary to a representative of the executive branch.

n The subordination of medical institutions not to the main military medical department, but to the heads of local troops, had a negative effect on the establishment of medical affairs in the army.

One of the directions in the military reform was military judicial reform. The main reason for its introduction was the desire to adapt the military courts to the analysis of cases related to the revolutionary movement in the army.

On May 15, 1867, a draft military judicial charter was adopted, on the basis of which three types of military courts were established: regimental courts, military district courts and the main military court.

Regimental courts were established in each regiment. It consisted of 3 people: the chairman - a staff officer and 2 members - chief officers. The composition of the court was appointed by the commander of the regiment and considered cases similar to the magistrate's court (about the lower ranks). Cases were heard by order of the regimental commander and the verdict was approved by the regimental commander. The judicial process in the regimental courts ruled out competition.

Military district courts were created under the military districts. He had jurisdiction over all cases of generals, staff and chief officers, officials of the military department. Return to court was decided by the commander of the unit. The judiciary process was adversarial.

The main military court was created under the Ministry of War as the “supreme court of cassation”. The chairman and members of the court were appointed from the generals directly by the king. The functions of the main military court were as follows: discussion of cases in connection with cassation complaints and protests, consideration of cases on the review of sentences due to newly discovered circumstances, decisions on the transfer to the court of persons in the rank of general, discussion of legislative issues, imposition of disciplinary sanctions on persons of the military judicial departments.

On May 5, 1868, a military charter on punishments was adopted, which provided for 2 types of punishments - criminal and correctional. TO criminal included: the death penalty, links to hard labor, settlement with the deprivation of all rights and imprisonment in a fortress. Correctional punishments were determined depending on class affiliation: for officers (exile to Siberia with dismissal and deprivation of rights, temporary imprisonment in a fortress with dismissal, temporary imprisonment in prison with dismissal, detention in a guardhouse, monetary penalties), for lower ranks (temporary assignment to the military correctional companies, imprisonment in a military prison, monetary penalties, deprivation of stripes for impeccable service with transfer to the category of penalties).

Disobedience was most severely punished (in peacetime from 4 to 12 years, in wartime - execution), violations of duties on guard (officers - demotion with imprisonment in a fortress, private - military prison, and in wartime - execution), crimes by office (link ) and especially severely punished violation of duties during hostilities.

The new organization of military courts provided for adversarial processes, publicity, but the courts remained dependent on command (especially regimental ones), which deprived them of their independence.

Simultaneously with the military reform, in 1868 it was developed Regulations on the field command of troops in wartime, according to which, in the conduct of hostilities, the troops in the theater of operations form one or more armies, each headed by a commander-in-chief, appointed and subordinate to the king. The military districts in the theater are subordinate to the commander-in-chief and supply the army.

On the basis of the Regulations, the structure of the field command of the army was significantly simplified, and the relationship between the commander-in-chief and the minister of war was clarified. However, there were a number of significant shortcomings: The possible presence of several commanders in chief with the same rights; It was not envisaged to create a department of military communications.

A question of organization regimental economy for a long time was the subject of discussion in the War Department. The first regimental farms began to take root in 1863. Since 1867, regimental commanders were deprived of the right to use the regiment's farm as personal. In connection with this, the regimental commanders had their salary increased from 720 to 1200 rubles. per year, and the commanders of individual battalions for 360 rubles. In addition, the division chiefs could issue to the regimental commanders annually, in the form of an allowance, a certain part of the savings received from the management of the regimental economy.

CONCLUSIONS:

n During the first 8 years, the War Department managed to implement a significant part of the planned reforms in the field of army organization and command and control.

n In the field of army organization, a system was created that could increase the number of troops in the event of war without resorting to new formations.

n The destruction of army corps and the continued division of infantry battalions into rifle and line companies had a negative effect in terms of combat training of troops.

n The reorganization of the War Department ensured the relative unity of military administration.

n As a result of the military district reform, local government bodies were created, excessive centralization of control was eliminated, operational control of troops and their mobilization were ensured.

2. Rearmament of the army.

One of the most important issues of military reforms was the rearmament of the army. The development of military equipment, which led to the transition from smooth-bore to rifled weapons, entailed a change in all combat training, requiring different tactical principles.

In 1856, a new type of infantry armament was developed - a 6-line, muzzle-loading, rifled rifle. In 1862, more than 260 thousand people were armed with it. A significant part of the rifles was produced in Germany and Belgium.

By the beginning of 1865, all infantry had been rearmed with 6-line rifles.

The rearmament of the army primarily depended on steel production. In 1855, Obukhov developed a project for the production of cast steel tools, and only in 1857 did the construction of a steel cannon factory begin in Zlatoust. At the end of 1860, Obukhov's 12-pounder was tested in St. Petersburg. The gun withstood 4000 shots, and the analysis of steel showed that it contains 99.81% iron in its composition, while Krupp steel - 98.54% at a price 3 times less than German. In 1862 Obukhov's cannon won first place at the World Exhibition in London. Thus, by the beginning of the 60s, all conditions were created in Russia for the development of domestic steel cannon production. In 1863, the construction of steel cannon factories began in St. Petersburg and Perm, and guns began to be cast in Petrozavodsk and the Aleksandrovsky plant.

The introduction of rifled, muzzle-loading guns began in 1860. The field artillery adopted 4-pounder 3.42-inch rifled guns, superior to those previously produced, both in range and in accuracy.

In the first half of the 60s, much attention was paid to the issue of manufacturing breech-loading guns. In 1863, 100 breech-loading field guns were purchased from Germany. For a number of years, a group of artillery scientists - Maievsky, Gadolin (MAA professors) developed improved gun systems, trying to eliminate the shortcomings inherent in German guns.

In 1866, armament for field artillery was approved, according to which all batteries of foot and horse artillery should have rifled, breech-loading guns. 1/3 of the foot batteries are to be armed with 9-pounders, and all other batteries of foot and horse artillery with 4-pounders.

For the rearmament of field artillery, 1200 guns were required. Due to the fact that the factories could not switch to the mass production of steel barrels in a short time, it was decided to achieve the production of breech-loading bronze guns. In the second half of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s, under the leadership of A.S. Lavrov, further experiments were carried out to improve artillery bronze. By 1870, the re-equipment of field artillery was completely completed, and by 1871 there were 448 guns in reserve.

In 1870, rapid-fire 10-barrel Gatling and 6-barrel Baranovsky guns with a rate of fire of 200 rounds per minute were adopted by artillery brigades. In 1872, the Baranovsky 2.5-inch rapid-fire cannon was put into service, in which the basic principles of modern rapid-fire guns were implemented. Abroad, such tools were invented only in the early 1890s.

The experience of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. led to the need to increase the number of field artillery batteries. In 1873, it was decided to strengthen the composition of the artillery brigades to 6 batteries (two newly formed batteries were armed with 9-pounder guns). In 1870, Professor Maievsky designed a 4-pound weighted gun with an initial speed of 1700 feet per second. (against 1000 for the usual one). But it was not adopted for service, due to lack of funding. According to its model, a similar weapon was produced at the Krupp factories for the German army.

Thus, over the course of 12 years (from 1862 to 1874), the number of batteries increased from 138 to 300, and the number of guns from 1104 to 2400. In 1874, there were 851 guns in stock, a transition was made from wooden carriages to iron ones.

Great value in improvement heavy fortress and siege artillery had the invention in the early 70s by Colonel Semenov of iron swivel and turret gun carriages. Despite a number of measures taken by the Military Government, the rearmament of the fortress artillery was carried out extremely slowly. On January 1, 1875, the number of fortress guns was only 72% of the state.

The birth of the Russian screw fleet during the Crimean War was associated with the development of close relations between the shipyards and factories of St. Petersburg and Moscow with the Naval Ministry. In 1859, the maritime department signed a contract for the manufacture of two engines with a capacity of 800 hp each. for the frigates "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Alexander Nevsky".

The post-war cooperation of the naval department with private industry in the 1860s grew into a close alliance, because. during this period, the naval ministry faced another revolution in naval technology - the construction of battleships. In October 1861, the 270-ton gunboat “Experience” was launched, with 4.5-inch bow armor, which was smelted in England. The first 3277-ton battleship "Pervenets" was built in London, where a group of Russian naval engineers sent to supervise the construction, at the same time conducted reconnaissance in order to familiarize themselves with the latest technology for building battleships. In 1862-63. A contract was signed with the English shipbuilder Mitchel for the construction of two battleships “Don't touch me” and “Kremlin” already in Russia. In three years, the Naval Ministry was able to move from purchasing battleships abroad to building them in Russia. In 1864, the Naval Ministry adopted a program for the construction of 8 armored ships with completion in 1869. In the 1870s, the Peter the Great armored ship was built with a total cost of 5.5 million rubles, after which, due to the scarcity of naval resources and financial crisis in the state, battleships were built only in small numbers.

In the early 60s, the question arose in the armies of Europe about the transition to rifled small arms loaded from the breech. Thus, before the War Ministry, having barely completed the rearmament of the army with muzzle-loading rifled weapons by the mid-60s, it was again forced to look for new systems of small arms. Initially, it was decided to remake the 6-line rifles in service. In 1866, this model (with a rate of fire of 5-6 rounds per minute) was put into service as a temporary one.

Along with the manufacture of new and alteration of old 6-line guns, at the end of 1868, a small-caliber rifle of the Berdan system, improved by Colonel Gorlov and Captain Gunius, caliber 4.2 lines, was adopted. By 1874, the weapons factories had finally mastered the production of small-caliber rifles, but by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, only a third of the infantry had been re-equipped with small-caliber rifles.

CONCLUSIONS:

n Transformations in the field of rearmament were aimed at providing the army with modern weapons and were designed to create a domestic military industry.

n Inventions and discoveries of Russian scientists and engineers Obukhov, Gadolin, Maievsky, Chernov, Lavrov, Gorlov and others greatly contributed to the implementation of the rearmament program.

n However, the economic backwardness of the country was an insurmountable obstacle to rearmament. These difficulties were exacerbated by the admiration of Alexander II and the courtiers for foreigners, to the detriment of the development of their own industry.

n Due to these circumstances, by the mid-70s. the rearmament of the army was far from being completed. The multi-system armament, the lack of the proper amount of heavy and siege artillery, as well as long-range field artillery guns, represented a serious drawback that was revealed during the war of 1877-1878.

3. CHANGES IN THE FIELD OF COMBAT TRAINING OF THE TROOPS.

The failures in the Crimean War caused serious criticism of the existing system of combat training of troops. It was necessary to change the system of training soldiers: to prepare them for actions on the ground, and not just for parades on the parade ground, it was necessary to teach them to read and write so that they performed their service more meaningfully.

As a result, since the end of the 1950s, combat training has assumed a slightly different character in individual units of the troops. In 1858, training battalions were formed to train teachers of “skillful shooting”, it became a practice to assign officers and infantry soldiers to artillery units to teach them how to shoot from guns. Attention was paid to the physical training of soldiers, for this purpose in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1858 training fencing and gymnastic schools were created to train instructors in gymnastics and fencing.

Measures were taken to spread literacy among the troops. In 1858, in addition to the troops of the guard, teaching writing, reading and arithmetic was carried out in the grenadier, 4.5 and 6 AK.

In 1863, a special order was issued by the Minister of War on the training of recruits, which indicated the need to train recruits for strictly practical purposes - training in what is needed in the war, with the main emphasis on the meaningful assimilation by soldiers of the knowledge they acquire.

A new branch of military education, training in combat engineering, is gaining great development. For this purpose, teams were assigned to the engineer brigades for a month to train instructors in the engineer business.

During the 1960s, new statutes were developed and issued. The main provisions of the combat training of troops were most fully disclosed in tactics textbook prof. Dragomirova, which was based on three training conditions: 1. To teach troops in peacetime only what is needed in war. 2. It is necessary to teach soldiers to fight in such a sequence that they receive a clear understanding of the purpose of the subject of training. 3. Teach primarily by example. Great importance was attached to the individual training of a soldier. Two types of combat formation of troops were established: loose (when using firearms) and closed (when using edged weapons).

"Charter of combat infantry service" was developed in 1866. The general nature of this charter was determined by new tactical principles of combat: the development of infantry fire in combination with the action of edged weapons, the improvement of loose formation, the development of flexibility in the formation of companies and battalions.

Combat statutes of foot and horse-artillery services were published in 1859. In these charters, as before, much attention was paid to the parade ground - parade receptions. The tactical unit was the gun. The battery commander only determined the distance for the first shot, and then the gunner independently introduced amendments. This principle, which remained from smooth-bore artillery, clearly did not correspond to new types of weapons.

However, more than unfinished charters, the training of gunners was hampered by continuous changes in the materiel of artillery, the lack of the proper amount of ammunition and the lack of a developed theory of firing from rifled guns. It was only in 1874 that the method of zeroing was adopted by capturing the target in a “fork”. The reason for the low level of fire training was also the lack of combat officers - artillerymen (for example, in the Vilna military district, the shortage of officers - artillerymen was 72%). Despite all these shortcomings, the overall tactical training of artillery has improved significantly. The most serious drawback was the lack of proper interaction with the infantry.

Charter on cavalry military service was published in 1869. According to which the composition of the regiment was determined by 4 squadrons and the 5th reserve. The squadron was divided into 4 platoons, 16 rows each. The main attention in the charter was given to the single training of riders, the section “On the attack” was significantly expanded. As a disadvantage, it can be noted that the value of gunfire for cavalry was still denied. The new charter was aimed at training cavalry units in what is needed in a war, however, parade ground traditions, which were stronger in cavalry than in infantry, were a serious brake on the introduction of a new training system, which led to poor preparedness of individual cavalry units for operations in combat conditions .

Literacy was an "auxiliary branch of military education." The influx into the army of new command personnel who graduated from military and cadet schools, and the training of a significant number of competent non-commissioned officers capable of teaching soldiers to read and write, led in the late 60s and the first half of the 70s to certain successes in spreading literacy among the troops. In the early 1970s, company libraries were created in all regiments, brigades and battalions, and soldiers' tea rooms were opened in a number of units.

The success of troop training depended primarily on the quality of training of officers and non-commissioned officers composition. In 1867, training teams were created at the headquarters of regiments and individual battalions for the training of non-commissioned officers in the infantry and cavalry with a training period of 2 years. The teams were divided into 4-5 people. from each company and squadron annually.

In 1874, a decision was made to create training teams in artillery and engineering units. Training teams in artillery were created of 2 types: with batteries, parks and fortress companies - for the training of scorers, gunners and laboratory technicians - with a training period of 1 year (the training program included drill education, knowledge of guard duty, gymnastics, literacy, arithmetic and artillery ). In training teams of this type, 10% of the batteries were trained. And the second type - with artillery brigades and fortresses for the training of fireworks with a training period of 2 years (the training program included the Russian language, arithmetic, geometry, artillery, fortification, horse breeding). These teams included 50% of those who successfully completed battery teams.

In order to reduce the shortage of non-commissioned officers in 1871, a provision was adopted on the admission of non-commissioned officer ranks to long-term service. In 1874, he received an increase in salary: sergeants and senior officers. wahmistram - 84 rubles, for non-commissioned officers - 60 rubles.

In qualitative terms, the composition of the officer corps in the mid-60s was extremely low. Most of the officers had no military education (about 70%). In 1872, the Ministry of War took a number of measures to improve the financial situation of officers (a significant increase in salaries, the establishment of apartment salaries, the issuance of salaries monthly, and not 3 times a year). Along with this, officers' meetings are introduced and libraries are arranged. These measures, combined with the regular training of officers introduced in 1873, helped to reduce the shortage and improve the education of officers.

CONCLUSIONS:

n A serious obstacle to combat training was the insufficient funding of the War Department.

n The second reason that significantly affected combat training was the lack of barracks (a little more than a quarter of the soldiers were stationed in them, and the rest were quartered among the population and gathered in their units only during summer camps) ..

n Reforms in the field of troop training were a consequence of the development of new tactical principles, the introduction of new types of weapons and were aimed at training troops in what is needed in war.

REFORMS OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

In 1862 there were four military academies - the Nikolaev General Staff, Artillery, Engineering and Medico-Surgical.

Serious changes in the program of the General Staff took place in 1865. The issues of training highly educated officers of the General Staff, who were well acquainted with all aspects of the military organization, were placed in the first place. The number of accepted students was limited to 50 officers per year. Officers who had served in the army for at least 4 years were subject to admission, and at least 2 of them in combat positions .. The duration of training was 2.5 years.

In 1863 the Artillery and Engineering academies were reassigned to the artillery and engineering departments, respectively. Acquisition Artillery Academy has changed significantly. If earlier graduates of artillery schools were admitted to the academy, now only officers who have served in the troops in combat positions for at least 2 years. In 1862, the academy was divided into 2 faculties: drill with a duration of study of 2 years and technical with a duration of study of 3 years. In 1865, in connection with the transformation of the Mikhailovsky Artillery School, the division into faculties was abolished. The contingent of listeners did not exceed 60 people. which were intended mainly "to take places in artillery schools, in the main and district artillery departments." In the 60-70s. the quality of teaching at the academy has improved significantly. Its professors Maievsky, Gadolin, Chebyshev and others turned the academy into a true center of Russian military-technical thought.

In 1867, another academy was created - the Military Law Academy.

In 1863, the cadet corps were abolished and 3 military schools- Konstantinovskoe, Pavlovskoe and Aleksandrovskoe. The duration of training in them was 2 years, and the number of cadets in each was 300 people. Graduating schools in the 1st category received the rank of second lieutenant, and in the 2nd category - ensign. In combat terms, each school was a battalion, subdivided into companies.

In 1864, the Nikolaev School of Guards Junkers was transformed into the Nikolaev Cavalry School with a contingent of junkers of 240 people. The Mikhailovsky Artillery and Nikolaev Engineering Schools also underwent a major reorganization. Since 1865, the Mikhailovsky Artillery School was transferred to a 3-year training period. The contingent of junkers was 160 people.

In addition to the schools listed above, military personnel were trained at the Military Topographic School, established in 1860, and at special schools: military paramedic and artillery.

In general, the training of officers in military schools has increased significantly compared to the pre-reform cadet corps, but the issue of training and staffing troops with officers has not been completely resolved.

Due to the fact that military schools could not meet the needs for officers, the question arose of creating cadet schools. Thus, the main contingent of officers was to be provided by the cadet schools created in the military districts. In the autumn of 1864, the first four schools were created: Moscow, Vilna, Helsingfors and Warsaw. In the next 2 years, 8 more cadet schools were opened, including 2 cavalry schools.

Initially, cadet schools were created to prepare military junkers and volunteers from the nobility for the officer rank, and since 1869 non-commissioned officers called up by recruitment were also admitted to them. Admission to the cadet schools for all of the above categories was not mandatory, but now no one could be promoted to officer without graduating from the cadet school, i.e. not having received certain general educational and military training.

The training course of the cadet schools was designed for 2 years. Those who graduated from cadet schools were divided into 2 categories. Those who graduated from the 1st category were assigned an officer rank in the troops, regardless of the available vacancies, those who graduated from the 2nd category - as vacancies opened.

By the end of the period under review, the number of cadet schools reached 17, incl. infantry - 11, cavalry - 2, Cossack - 4. On 1.01. In 1877, there were 4750 people in the states of the cadet schools, and 11536 people were released.

Junker schools provided the needs of the army for officers. The influx of officers from among the uneducated minors from the nobility into the troops was stopped.

CONCLUSIONS:

n The system of military education developed and implemented by the War Department was a significant step forward.

n The reorganization of military academies contributed to the better training of officers of the highest category, but the number of academy graduates was negligible.

n A serious drawback was the lack of short-term retraining courses for senior officers.

n The creation of military schools significantly raised the level of training of officers, however, due to the insufficient number of graduates, the needs of the army were not met by officers even in peacetime staff. If for the infantry and cavalry this issue was resolved at the expense of the cadet schools, then for the artillery and engineering troops this issue remained unresolved.

REFORMS IN THE FIELD OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AND MANNING OF TROOPS IN THE 70s.

The international situation of the late 1960s, characterized by a significant increase in armaments in a number of European states, required Russia to increase wartime staffing. This was also due to the large length of the borders of the Russian Empire, when, during the conduct of hostilities in the region, a significant part of the troops could not be redeployed.

The path of increasing the standing army could not be more acceptable, due to the large financial costs. An increase in the composition of existing units according to the wartime staff was also rejected by Milyutin, because. firstly, it did not give tangible results (the introduction of the fourth battalions in the war in all regiments would increase the army by only 188 thousand people), and secondly, this would lead to “an increase in the size of the army to the detriment of its dignity”, in the absence of proper conditions magnification. Rejecting these paths, Milyutin came to the conclusion that formation of a reserve army. Which should be formed from among persons who have completed military service. At the same time, it was planned to change the order of military service and reduce the terms of active military service.

The main direction in the formation of the infantry reserve was the deployment on the basis of local battalions (numbering 500 people) of reserve regiments (numbering up to 3050 people) and a local battalion remaining in place to carry out guard duty, train recruits and form marching battalions from them. Thus, on the basis of 120 local battalions, in case of war, 120 regiments (30 mobile reserve divisions), 120 new local battalions and 240 militia squads were formed, with a total number of 660 thousand people. These proposals were set out in Milyutin's note to Alexander II "On the Development of Our Armed Forces" in November 1870 and formed the basis for the reorganization of the army.

In August 1871, Milyutin made new note, which highlights new considerations for increasing the armed forces in case of war, without resorting to the formation of new units.

It was supposed to increase the number of infantry divisions in peacetime to 64 (without guards and grenadiers), i.e. 10 divisions, with half of them located in the border areas - with a staffing of 75% of wartime, and the second half, located in the internal districts - with a staffing of 56% of wartime. At the same time, army rifle brigades were reduced, as a result, the total number of troops increased by only 80 battalions. 2

The composition of the artillery was strengthened by the formation of new 10 brigades (according to the number of divisions) and an increase to 6 in the number of batteries in the existing brigades. Cavalry artillery brigades were disbanded, and their batteries were included one at a time in the cavalry divisions.

It was planned to increase the number of cavalry divisions from 10 to 19, by limiting their composition to 4 regiments: dragoon, uhlans, hussars and cossacks.

Thus, the total number of active field troops in peacetime was to be 651 thousand people. (an increase of 113 thousand people), and in the military 1095 thousand people. (an increase of 119 thousand people).

Reserve or auxiliary troops were to be formed only in wartime. With each of the reserve battalions, a separate reserve battalion was created. Thus, the total number of these reserve units was to be 200. Reserve artillery units were supposed to be formed with spare artillery batteries.

February 28, 1873 opened secret meeting, under the chairmanship of Alexander II. The meeting finally approved the organization and composition of the active troops. The number of infantry divisions remained unchanged, with the exception of the formation of one division in the Caucasian Army. Each division was divided into 2 brigades. Organizationally, the division included 4 regiments, the regiment - 4 battalions, 4 companies each.

In the cavalry, the existing divisions, consisting of 6 regiments, were divided in half, forming 16 divisions of 4 regiments, for which each of them was assigned one Don Cossack regiment. Each division was also divided into 2 brigades.

The composition of the artillery units was determined by 8-battery brigades, based on 1 infantry division - 1 artillery brigade of foot artillery, and for 1 cavalry division - 2 horse-artillery batteries.

Army corps were created in the border areas in peacetime. The corps commanders were subordinate to the commanders-in-chief and the commander of the troops of the districts.

The term of active military service was reduced to 6 years (in 1856 the term of active military service was officially reduced to 15 years, in 1859 to 12 years, and in 1868 to 10 years. As a result of these measures, the size of the army was reduced from 2.3 million in 1856 to 700 thousand people in 1868. Another 500 thousand trained reservists could be called up from the reserve at any time.But in terms of the number of soldiers capable of immediately taking up arms in case of war, Russia still lagged behind the leading European powers).

Turning to the issue of preparing all-class duty, let us dwell on the note “On the main grounds for personal military service” dated November 7, 1870. It set out a draft provision on personal military service:

1. All persons from 21 to 41 years old, regardless of class affiliation, are in one of the 4 categories of the Armed Forces: a) in the regular army or navy, b) in irregular troops, c) in reserve troops, d) in the militia.

2. Admission to active service is decided by lot.

3. Benefits based on marital status - exemption from lottery is granted to: a) the only son (grandson - having no sons) of a widow (widower), b) the brother of orphans, c) the only son left after the death of his parents, if he has a family, household or house.

4. Benefits for education - deferrals are provided to persons studying at the time of conscription in secondary and higher educational institutions.

5. In peacetime, it was allowed to replace the call with a redemption sum with enrollment in the militia.

6. The total term of service was set at 10 years, of which the term of active service was determined by the need of the state, after which the soldier was 5 years in the reserve troops and then up to 41 years in the militia.

7. Persons who have graduated from higher and secondary educational institutions are given the right to enter the army as volunteers, and at the end of the service, having passed the exam, be enrolled in the reserve as officers.

On November 17, a “highest order” was published on the creation of a commission to develop the Regulations on military service. On January 5, the commission began its work. Let us dwell on the development of its most important sections draft charter.

Military service extended to the entire population of the Empire and the Kingdom of Poland, with the exception of the Transcaucasian Territory, the Turkestan military district, the Primorsky and Amur regions, the northern regions of the Yenisei, Tobolsk and Tomsk provinces.

The general term of conscription service was set in the ground forces at 15 years (6 years of active and 9 years of reserve) and at the end of it - stay in the militia up to 38 years. Persons who have reached the age of 20 were subject to the call. The annual contingent of conscription was determined at 30% of the number of persons who had reached military age, the rest were enlisted directly into the militia. The issue of conscription was determined by the presence of benefits, and in its absence - by drawing lots.

Benefits according to marital status were determined: 1st category - for the only son with an incapacitated father or mother - a widow and for the death of the father in the presence of disabled family members. 2 categories - to the only son, with a working father. 3 categories - for persons directly following the brothers who are in active military service.

Benefits for education were established in 2 types: deferment from conscription until graduation from higher and secondary educational institutions; and reduction in active service according to the education received. For persons with higher education - 1.5 years (with a total length of service in the reserve up to 36 years). For persons who graduated from progymnasium and college - 3 years, in reserve - 12 years. For those who graduated from primary schools - 4 years, in the reserve - 11 years.

Benefits for property status were provided to single familyless individuals who own and manage a land plot with a farm or commercial or industrial establishments - a delay of 1 year.

Benefits by occupation were granted: complete exemption - to clergy of all Christian denominations; with enrollment in the reserve - medical and veterinary doctors, pharmacists, boarders of the Academy of Arts and artists of the imperial theaters, teachers.

In mid-April 1873, the draft statute on military service was submitted for discussion to the Special Presence of the State Council. As a result, a number of changes were made to the draft Charter that did not affect the main fundamental provisions.

CONCLUSIONS:

n The extensive program for the transformation of the army, approved by the secret meeting of 1873, was almost never implemented over the next 3-4 years, mainly due to lack of funds.

n A number of serious steps have been taken in developing the mobilization plan. At the end of 1875, a mobilization committee was created, which from 1875 to 1877. brought into a proper system all the information about the readiness of the army in all branches of its personal and material supply .; discussed and pointed out the measures to be taken by the departments for the best distribution of available funds and replenishment of missing items. In May 1876, he began to draw up a general mobilization plan, but the complication of the political situation in the spring of 1876 forced him to abandon this work and begin preparing a number of urgent measures related to the threat of war.

III.CONCLUSION.

The best test of military transformation is war. In this regard, the war of 1877-1878, which led to the liberation of the Balkan peoples from Turkish oppression, was of great importance.

However, the conclusions drawn from the results of this war cannot be absolutely accurate, because. a number of reforms have either not yet been fully implemented or could not yet bear fruit. On the other hand, the Russian-Turkish war did not require general mobilization.

Milyutin's military reforms in the period of 60-70s. XIX century were an inseparable part of the bourgeois reforms carried out by Alexander II.

The organization of troops, adopted in the 1960s, set itself the task of reducing to a minimum the composition of the army in peacetime and its maximum increase during the war.

The reorganization of the War Ministry and the introduction of the military district system created a relative unity of administration and eliminated excessive centralization.

Measures in the field of rearmament of the army were reduced to providing it with new types of weapons, but this task was carried out extremely slowly and by the beginning of the 80s. has not been fully completed.

Transformations in the field of combat training were aimed at teaching the troops what is needed in the war, the introduction of new equipment and the development of the soldier's personal initiative.

The reforms of military educational institutions have significantly changed the entire system of officer training, and the issue of manning the troops with officers in peacetime has been resolved.

As a result of the introduction of all-class military service, a mobilization reserve was basically created.

The desire to preserve the parade ground - parade traditions interfered with the combat training of troops

The difficult financial situation of the country led to the extremely insignificant implementation of the decisions of the secret meeting of 1873.

Military reform of the 1860s-1870s played an important role in the reorganization of the armed forces, the system of their training, recruitment and rearmament, however, due to incompleteness, it was not able to fully ensure the creation of a solid foundation for the defense of the state.

STUDENT 3111 EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT

lieutenant colonel V. SYSKOV

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